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THE EFFECT OF DELAY BETWEEN ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT AND PRELIMINARY HEARING UPON

ADMISSIBILITY OF AD INTERIM CONFESSIONS
HAYFORD

0.

ENWALL

In the procedure leading up to the trial of persons charged with crimes
under the laws of the United States, extra-judicial or pre-trial confessions
of arrested persons constitute an important, and in many cases a vital
and indispensable, portion of the evidence justifying conviction. It is, of
course, well recognized that a voluntary confession or admission of guilt
is one of the highest and most convincing forms of proof.
Under our system conflict arises frequently between the preservation
of the safeguards created and intended for the protection of our society
against the invasion or infringement of the rights of its members to freedom and property, and the burden of protecting such society from crime.
The members of the several criminal investigating agencies of the
national government are, with few exceptions, honest, intelligent, and conscientious public servants, zealously and effectively performing their duties.
A large number of these officers receive special and continuing academic
training in the increasingly efficient techniques of crime detection. It is
normally the object of all such agencies to ascertain the truth and the full
facts about any alleged violation under investigation. These officers are
trained and become experienced in the interrogation of witnesses and suspects. Dealing as they do with law violators, they recognize familiar
patterns of conduct, cause, effect, and motivation. They frequently have
extensive and precise knowledge of the manner of operation of reputedly
law-violating members of a community, of their habits, movements, associates, and affiliations. They become familiar with the psychology of
wrong-doers and proficient in recognizing signs of falsehood, evasion, hesitation, and other normal human reactions of those seeking to withhold
or conceal the truth.
Prior to the decision in McNabb v. United States,' a confession by one
in custody was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States as
admissible in evidence unless it was proved to have been obtained by pressures so strong that it was in fact involuntarily made; in other words, that
the individual will of the confessor had been overcome by tortures, mob
1318 U. S. 332 (1943).

[ 330]
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violence, fraud, trickery, threats or promises. 2 The bases for the exclusion of such involuntary confessions are the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 3
The McNabb case was described by Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in a
later case, 4 as a "sudden departure from the former federal rule as to the
admissibility of confessions." The petitioners were convicted in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee of the murder
of a federal Alcohol Tax Unit investigator. The convictions were sustained by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and certiorari was granted
by the Supreme Court. The extra-judicial confessions of the defendants
constituted the crux of the Government's case against them. 5
In its decision the Court summarized as follows the pertinent facts
regarding the manner in which the confessions were obtained from three
6
of the defendants:
"Freeman and Raymond McNabb were arrested in the middle of
the night at their home. Instead of being brought before a United
States Commissioner or a judicial officer, as the law requires, in
order to determine the sufficiency of the justification for their detention, they were put in a barren cell and kept there for fourteen
hours. For two days they were subjected to unremitting questioning by numerous officers. Benjamin's confession was secured by
detaining him unlawfully and questioning him continuously for five
or six hours. [Benjamin McNabb was a third brother who surrendered voluntarily after the arrest of the other two]. The McNabbs had to submit to all this without the aid of friends or the
'Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1943); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S.
219 (1941).
'See Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in Upshaw v. United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 170,
178 (1948).
'Upshaw v. United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 170, 174 (1948).
"As that decision involved the failure of the federal officers to take the defendants
before a committing magistrate before certain confessions were obtained from them,
reference is pertinent to the wording of the statutory requirement existing at the
time of the arrest. Section 595 U. S. C., Title 18, provided in pertinent part as
follows:
"It shall be the duty of the marshal, his deputy, or other officer who may arrest
a person charged with any crime or offense, to take the defendant before the
nearest United States Commissioner or the nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction under existing laws for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial."
6318 U. S. 332, 344-345 (1943).
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benefit of counsel. The record leaves no room for doubt that the
questioning of the petitioners took place while they were in custody of the arresting officers and before any order of commitment
was made."
Following such summarization of facts the Court held:
"Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a
flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded
cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves
accomplices in willful disobedience of law. Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured. But to permit
such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction in the federal
courts would stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into
law."
On the same day as its decision in the McNabb case the Court decided
the case of Anderson v. United States7 and applied to it the same reasoning and announced principle.
In the Andeeson case the petitioners were convicted in the same district
court of a conspiracy to damage the property of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, a corporation in which the Government owned stock. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. As in the
McNabb case, the crux of the Government's case consisted of confessions,
but in this case they were secured by agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, after protracted questioning and while the defendants were
in the admittedly illegal detention of the local sheriff, who had arrested
8
them upon suspicion and without warrants.
7318 U. S. 350 (1943).
8

In its opinion the Court stated (p. 356):
"Unaided by relatives, friends, or counsel, the men were unlawfully held,
some for days, and subjected to long questioning in the hostile atmosphere of a
small company dominated mining town. The men were not arrested by the
federal officers until April 30th, and only then were they arraigned before a
United States Commissioner, except for Ballew who was not arraigned until
May 2nd or 3rd. [The sheriff had arrested them on April 24, 1940]. There
was a working arrangement between the federal officers and the sheriff of Polk
County which made possible the abuses revealed by this record. Therefore, the
facts that the federal officers themselves were not formally guilty of illegal conduct does not affect the admissibility of the evidence which they secured improperly through collaboration with state officers. Gambino v. U. S., 275 U. S.
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The next case involving the admissibility of confessions prior to hearing before a committing magistrate was that of United States v. Mitchel. 9
The accused had been twice convicted of housebreaking and larceny in the
District of Columbia. The evidence consisted in large part of confessions made to the arresting officers. The two convictions were reversed
by the Court of Appeals solely on the ground that the confessions were
rendered inadmissible by the McNabb decision.
The salient facts were stated by the Supreme Court in its decision as
follows:10
"In August and early October, 1942, two houses in the District
of Columbia were broken into and from each property was stolen.
The trail of police investigation led to Mitchell who was taken into
custody at his home at 7 o'clock in the evening on Monday, October
12, 1942, and driven by two police officers to the precinct station.
Within a few minutes of his arrival at the police station, Mitchell
admitted guilt, told the officers of various items of stolen property
to be found in his home and consented to their going to his home to
recover the property."
It further appeared that it was eight days later before he was presented
before a committing magistrate, Mitchell having remained in police custody during the intervening period.
The Court sustained the conviction and held the McNabb decision
inapplicable, stating:' "It is these admissions and that property which supported the convictions, and which were deemed by the court below to have been
inadmissible. Obviously, the circumstances of disclosure by Mitchell are wholly different from those which brought about the disclcsures by the McNabbs. Here there was no disclosure induced
by illegal detention, no evidence was obtained in violation of any
legal rights, but instead the consent to a search of his home, the
prompt acknowledgment by an accused of his guilt, and the subsequent rueing apparently of such spontaneous cooperation and confession of guilt."
310, 314; Byars v. U. S., 273 U. S. 28, 33-34."
0322 U. S. 65 (1944).
"'Id.at 69.
'11d. at 70. (Italics supplied).
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It having been urged that, however voluntary the confession of Mitchell might have been, its voluntary character was nullified by his subsequent illegal detention without arraignment for eight days, the Supreme
2
Court stated further:'
"Undoubtedly his detention during this period was illegal ....

But

in any event, the illegality of Mitchell's detention does not retroactively change the circumstances under which he made the disclosures. These, we have seen, were not elicited through illegality.
Their admission, therefore, would not be use by the government
of the fruits of wrongdoing by its officers."
In the case of Ashcrajt v. Tennessee13 the accused was convicted by
a Tennessee state court as an accessory to the murder of his wife. The
State Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Certain alleged confessions,
without which the evidence would have been insufficient for conviction,
were admitted. It was the admission of such confessions that the petitioner urged to be erroneous, claiming that they had been extorted from
him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It appeared from the facts that, after his arrest without a warrant, the
accused was held incommunicado for thirty-five hours, during which time,
without sleep or rest, while detained in the homicide investigating office of
the county jail and surrounded by the usual paraphernalia of such an
office, including high-powered lights, he was interrogated by relays of
officers and investigators. Although no question was raised as to any
failure to commit him formally, it did not appear that he was presented to
a committing magistrate for a hearing before, during, or after his interrogation.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, saying:1 4
"We think a situation such as that here shown by uncontradicted
evidence is so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect
against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear. It is inconceivable that any court of justice in the land, conducted as our
courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in
"Id. at 70.
13322 U. S. 143 (1944).

"'Id.at 154.
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relays to keep a defendant witness under continuous cross examination for thirty six hours without rest or sleep in an effort to
extract a 'voluntary' confession.... The Constitution of the United
States stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an
American court by means of a coerced confession."
In the case of Lyons v. Oklahoma,15 as in the Ashcraft case, the petitioner was convicted in the lower court for murder. His confession furnished material evidence to support his conviction, and he claimed error
as to its admission, urging that it was involuntary.
Lyons was arrested without a warrant and was questioned immediately
for two hours in the jail, thereafter remaining in custody. Eleven days
later he was interrogated in the county prosecutor's office for between six
to eight hours during a night and the early morning. Such interrogation
resulted in an oral confession. There was conflicting testimony as to
physical abuse and threats during these two interrogations. After his oral
confession he was taken to the scene of the crime, questioned as to certain
instruments used, and returned to the jail. Later that day he was taken
to a nearby town and then to the penitentiary, where he signed a written
confession -this being some twelve hours after his early-morning verbal
confession. No question arose as to coercion at the time of his signed
confession. It was urged, however, that because of the abuses incident to
the earlier one a presumption of involuntariness existed as to the later,
signed confession.
The Court held that, under the circumstances, the effects of any
coercion which might have vitiated the earlier verbal confession had been
dissipated prior to his second, signed confession, and that the latter was
voluntary. It held, further, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
forbid the use of a subsequent voluntary confession by an accused from
whom a confession may have been coerced.
In this case, as in the McNabb and other cases cited in this decision,
the Court re-enunciated the rule that "the mere questioning of a suspect,
while in the custody of police officers is not prohibited either as a matter
of common law or due process."' 8
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 17 for the
U. S. 596 (1944).
"I1d. at 601
17
Because of their current application to this discussion, Rules 5(a) and (b) are
quoted in full:
15322
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district courts of the United States, effective March 21, 1946, the time
within which a prisoner must be brought before a committing magistrate
was defined differently in different statutes.' 8 Rules 4 and 5 superseded
all conflicting statutory provisions defining the time within which a prisoner must be brought before a committing magistrate. A single standard
was established- "without unnecessary delay."' 9
The first case involving confessions after delay that was considered
by the Supreme Court after the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Pro20
cedure, including Rule 5 (a), was that of Upshaw v. United States.
Pre-trial confessions, without which a conviction of the defendant for
grand larceny in the District of Columbia could not have been properly
had, were admitted in evidence over the objection that they had been
obtained illegally in violation of Rule 5(a) and in violation of the principles announced in the McNabb case.
The facts in the case are not detailed with particularity in the opinion
21
but are recited in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reed as follows:
"(a) Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest
under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before
the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered
to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States.
When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or
other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
"(b) Statement by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall inform the
defendant of the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel and of his
right to have a preliminary examination. He shall also inform the defendant
that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement made by
him may be used against him. The Commissioner shall allow the defendant
reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules."
1820 STAT. 341 (1879), 18 U. S. C. §593 (1946) (operating illicit distillery, arrest,
bail) ; 28 STAT. 416 (1896), 18 U. S. C. §595 (1946) (persons arrested taken before
nearest officer for hearing) ; 48 STAT. 1008 (1935), 5 U. S. C. §300a (1946) (division
of investigation, authority of officers to serve warrants and make arrests) ; 33 STAT.
873 (1905), 16 U. S. C. §10 (1946) (arrests by employees of Park Service for violations
of laws and regulations); 40 STAT. 756 (1918), 16 U. S. C. §706 (1946) (Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, arrests, search warrants); 43 STAT. 605 (1924), 33 U. S. C. §436
(1946) ; 25 STAT. 209 (1888), 33 U. S. C. §446 (1946) (arrests without warrants);
28 STAT. 360 (1894), 33 U. S. C. §452 (1946); Rav. STAT. §4606, 46 U. S. C. §708
(1946).

"0 See note 17 suPra.
2069 Sup. Ct. 170 (1948).
'1 1d. at 181 n.25.
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"Upshaw, a negro man able to read and write who had completed one year of high school, was arrested at his room by Detectives Furr and Culpepper on a charge of larceny of a wrist watch at
about 2 A. M., Friday, June 6. He was taken to No. 10 precinct
and questioned for about 30 minutes. Furr testified that petitioner
was under the influence of alcohol at the time. Upshaw denied this.
He was coughing sporadically at the time of his arrest and subsequently until his commitment. At approximately 10 A. M., June
6, he was questioned again by Furr, at which time he denied guilt.
Culpepper questioned him through the bars in the cell block at 11
A. M. and again at 5:30 P. M. on June 6. Furr questioned him
again for approximately 30 minutes at 7:30 P. M. on the same day.
At 9:00 A. M., June 7, Upshaw confessed, and at 9:30 A. M. he
signed a statement which he identified as his statement at 2 P. M.,
June 7. Thus some 31 hours intervened between the arrest and the
confession. At 9:00 P. M. that night Upshaw was taken to the
home of the complaining witness where he repeated his confession to
her. The petitioner was taken before a magistrate for commitment
on Monday, June 9. The officers testified that they had not had
him committed sooner because they did not have a sufficient case
against him to cause Police Court to hold him and because they
wanted to continue their investigation."
The Court held that, despite the absence of the aggravation of a continuous questioning of this petitioner for many hours by numerous officers, as existed in the McNabb case, this case fell squarely within the
McNabb ruling; and that his thirty-one hour police detention without a
warrant, coupled with the failure of the officers to present him before a
committing magistrate, as required by Rule 5(a), made his confession
inadmissible. Accordingly, the Court reversed his conviction.
The argument was made to the trial court that this method of arresting, holding, and questioning people on mere suspicion was in accordance
with "the usual police procedure of questioning a suspect." The Supreme
Court, in referring to this argument, held that the confessions were obtained in violation of law and thus were inadmissible under the McNabb
rule, however usual the practice might be. The lower court had held that
the McNabb rule was inapplicable to this case; and in referring to the
applicability of that case to the instant one the Supreme Court said
22
further:
22

1d. at 171.
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"In the McNabb case we held that the plain purpose of the requirement that persons should promptly be taken before committing
magistrates was to check resort by officers to 'secret interrogation
of persons accused of crime.' "
Varying impressions as to the rule that the McNabb case announces
appear in the cases cited and are summarized in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Reed in the Upshaw case. 2 3 He suggests and reasons away
the view that the McNabb confessions were barred as a punishment of, or
penalty against, the officers because they were thought to have disobeyed
the command of the committing statute. He suggests and reasons away
the view that they were barred because unlawful imprisonment in and
of itself is apt to be followed by an involuntary confession, justifying the
exclusion of all confessions received before judicial commitment after a
prisoner is kept in custody more than a reasonable time without being
taken before a committing magistrate. He asserts what he expresses to
be his understanding of the true rule of the McNabb case, namely, that
"purposeful, unlawful detention illegally to extract evidence and the successful extraction of confessions under psychological pressure, other than
mere detention for a limited period, makes confessions so obtained inadmissible."
Despite such interpretation in the Upsiaw case, however, the majority
decision specifically declared in the following words with reference to the
24
McNabb case:
"The McNabb confessions were thus held inadmissible because the
McNabbs were questioned while held in 'plain disregard of the duty
enjoined by Congress upon Federal officers' promptly to take them
before a judicial officer. In the McNabb case there were confessions 'induced by illegal detention.' "
There can, therefore, be but little doubt that the clear effect of the
McNabb, Anderson, and Upshaw decisions is to extend the rule as to
involuntary confessions theretofore held; and that the illegal detention of
a person without taking him before a committing magistrate "without
unnecessary delay" is, in and of itself, declared judicially such an improper inducement of a confession, obtained during the illegal detention,
as to constitute it involuntary in character and hence inadmissible.
11Id. at 172.
2

Id. at 171.
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The essential distinction between the McNabb and the Mitchell cases
lies in the fact that the Court held in the McNabb case that substantial
illegal detention of the arrested person prior to his confession rendered
his confession involuntary, whereas it held in the Mitchell case that the
illegal detention subsequent to an otherwise voluntary confession did not
operate retroactively to affect its voluntary character and hence its admissibility. Weight is lent to the interpretation of the McNabb decision
stated above when Subsection (b) of Rule 5 is read in conjunction with
Subsection (a).
Had the Court at the time of the adoption of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure desired to avoid the possibility of involuntary pre-trial confessions prior to the commitment hearing, it might well have proscribed the
admission in evidence of any confessions made by an improperly detained
person prior to such a hearing. This it did not do, although the McNabb
decision was then of very recent anterior date and in sharp focus.
There is no positive legislation or rule of court requiring that the
arresting officer advise anay arrested person of any of his rights, including
that against self-incrimination. Over the course of time, however, a rule
of practice or conduct has grown up whereby investigating and arresting
officers usually advise the suspect against self-incrimination during or
prior to their interrogation.
In Rule 5 (b), however, there is the specific direction that the commissioner shall acquaint the defendant with his several rights, including
that against self-incrimination, and of his right to retain counsel. This
directive, coupled with the requirement of the production of the prisoner
before such magistrate "without unreasonable delay," must logically lead
us to the conclusion that it was not contemplated that the interval between
arrest and hearing would be employed primarily by the arresting officers
to coerce involuntary confessions or, in fact, to elicit any statements at
all. Otherwise, the function and duty of the commissioner to acquaint
the person with his rights would be an empty, meaningless form, devoid
of benefit to the prisoner and too late to be of value to him in deciding
what course to follow.
Accordingly, in accordance with the foregoing interpretation of Rule 5
and the import of the McNabb and Anderson cases as explained by the
Upshaw case, and in accordance with the Mitchell case, it appears that the
present rules of evidence with reference to the admissibility of confessions
may be stated as follows:
1. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, any confession is involuntary and inadmissible if wrung
from an arrested person, whether before or after a preliminary
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magistrate's hearing, under pressures so strong that the individual will of the confessor has been overcome by torture, mob
violence, fraud, trickery, threats, or promises.
2. Any confession is involuntary and inadmissible when obtained
from an arrested person during the interval between his arrest
and his production before a committing magistrate if such interval is a period of time constituting an "unnecessary delay" in so
producing him.
3. A confession otherwise voluntary is not to be considered involuntary merely because of the fact that after such confession
an unnecessary delay, and hence an illegal detention, occurs in
the production of the confessor before the committing magistrate.
This summarization of the presently conceived proper statement of
the rules raises at once the need of a precise definition of the term "unnecessary delay." As Mr. Justice Reed pointed out, the Supreme Court in
the several cases discussed failed to distinguish between necessary and
unnecessary delay. Hence we must look to other precedents for guidance. What constitutes unnecessary delay is to be determined by the
facts and circumstances of the particular case.
The question arose and has been decided in the cases hereinafter
described, inter alia.
In 1930 a circuit court of appeals decided the case of Janus v. United
States ex rel. Humphrey.2 5 The suit was one for false imprisonment,
based on an alleged illegal arrest and detention of one Roy Humphrey by
W. H. Jensen, purportedly acting under the orders of Stephen Janus,
Superintendent of the Ft. Hall Indian Agency, Idaho.
Jensen arrested Humphrey for grazing sheep unlawfully on an Indian
reservation. The arrest was made at about 11:30 A. M., July 13, 1927.
Shortly thereafter they started for Pocatello, where the nearest United
States Commissioner was located, proceeding at a rate consistent with the
distance and mode of travel. Jensen put Humphrey in the sheriff's custody in the local jail and proceeded immediately to try to locate the United States Commissioner for a hearing. He was not then available, however, as he was out of town. Because of a variety of reasons, not necessary to detail here but some of which were occasioned by the prisoner,
an arrangement was reached between all interested parties which resulted
in the commissioner's ordering the release of Humphrey on the night of
July 14th.
2r38 F.2d 431 (C. C. A. 9th 1930).
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At the trial a judgment was entered for the plaintiff, based upon the
finding of the jury that an unreasonable period had elapsed before Humphrey was taken before the magistrate.
The defendant had requested the court to give the following instruction to the jury: 2 6
"What is a reasonable time for an officer to detain an arrested
person before taking him before a United States Commissioner is
impossible for comprehensive definition; it depends upon the circumstances of each case and is for you to determine upon consideration of all evidence; in such determination you should consider the
accessibility of a commissioner; whether or not and when he was
available for the purpose, his distance from the place, the safety
with which the person arrested might be taken before him; and all
other facts and circumstances then existing. During such time as
you may find was reasonable the officer had the right and it was
his duty to detain the arrested person in some safe and convenient
place."
The trial judge failed to give such requested instruction, and the Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding the above instruction to
be a proper one upon the theory on which the case was tried.
On February 25, 1947, Chief Justice Laws, of the District Court of
the District of Columbia, rendered an opinion in the case of United States
v. Boone. His opinion was not reported, although by decision of the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia the appellant's conviction for robbery was affirmed. 2 7 Mr. Justice Laws' opinion was
considered so significant that it was extensively quoted in the report
28
of the Attorney General:
"The defendant was arrested at 9 o'clock on Saturday
morning, September 28, 1946, in connection with the robbery of a
hotel which had taken place three hours earlier. He was taken to
a police precinct, was 'booked,' and between 11 and 11:30 was
identified in the 'line-up' by the hotel night clerk.
"The arresting officer talked to defendant for about twenty
minutes at the time of the arrest, for about the same period at the
"Id. at 437.

27164 F.2d 102 (C. C. A. 9th 1930).

No. 1, BuLL. C. Div. Dmr. op Jusucm, Part 1 FD. R. CL PRoc.,
Mar. 24, 1947.
'VWol. II,
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time of the line-up, and for about a half hour at 5 in the afternoon.
Between 9 and 11 that evening defendant sent for the officer and
made certain admissions. This was repeated at 1 o'clock the following (Sunday) afternoon.
"The defendant was not taken before a committing magistrate
until Tuesday, October 1. In support of his motion for a new trial
he urged that this should have been done immediately after the
line-up on Saturday morning, and that his subsequent admissions
occurred during a period of illegal detention and were therefore inadmissible.
"The court said that the rule of the McNabb and Mitchell cases
goes no further than to require the police to take an arrested person before a committing magistrate with reasonable promptness.
It quoted Rule 5(a), pointing out that the phrase 'without unnecessary delay' is used rather than 'forthwith' or 'immediately.' In
determining what is an 'unreasonable' or 'unnecessary' delay, said
Judge Laws, the court will consider the circumstances of the detention. Since the case is not reported, the following language is believed important enough to warrant quotation:
'The question of what is an unreasonable detention or a
detention under aggravating circumstances is one which must
be decided upon the facts of each case. After the arrest of
one accused of crime, police officers should have opportunity
to make further investigations of facts beyond those made
before the arrest. Such investigations may be as decidedly in
the interests of an innocent person who has been arrested as
in the interests of efficient law enforcement. The preliminary
hearing before a committing magistrate is provided in order
to determine whether the arrested person should be held to
bail and if found he should be held, the amount of the bail
is fixed. While the testimony at such hearing usually is only
that adduced by the prosecution, yet in the discretion of the
committing magistrate, defense witnesses may be heard. A
fair opportunity to obtain the presence of prosecution witnesses at this hearing should be granted.
'It is a matter of common knowledge that certain procedures customarily have been followed by police in the District of Columbia for many years. Those procedures have
never been questioned. Upon the arrest of a person, he is
conducted to one of the police precincts or to the Detective
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Bureau, where he is "booked."
'In an arrest book kept by the police is entered the name,
address, color, and nationality of the party arrested, the
charge made against him, the name of the arresting officer,
and a list of property taken from the prisoner. Information
with respect to bond is also recorded. The suspect is then
fingerprinted and photographed. If the suspect desires to
make a statement he is given the opportunity. If not, he is
questioned. In cases where an alibi is given, the police often
seek to verify the truth of the alibi. Witnesses are summoned if available. If there were eye witnesses to the crime
and there is a question of identity, a line-up is arranged. In
order that individuals of a similar description may be obtained for the lineup, the police sometimes find it necessary
to send for prisoners confined at other precincts. If identification is made as a result of the line-up, it is the practice
of the police to question the suspect further, particularly
when his identification clashes with a statement previously
given.
'These procedures by the police in some cases may be
completed within a short time. In other cases, they may take
a longer time. When completed and the witnesses to go before the committing magistrate are available, the arrested
person should be promptly taken before the committing magistrate. If this is not done and the suspect is held solely in
order to build up an insufficient case or to afford opportunity
to harass him or subject him to continued questioning or other pressures, the delay is unreasonable and aggravating.
'In the case before me, the defendant was not at any time
questioned over a long period of time. Arrested at 9 o'clock
Saturday morning, he was not identified by the victim of the
robbery until sometime around 11 or 11:30 the same morning. It thus appears that not until nearly 12 o'clock noon
had the police completed their usual procedures incident to
the arrest of the defendant. Under the Code of Laws for the
District of Columbia, after twelve o'clock noon on Saturday
is declared to be a holiday in the District of Columbia "for
all purposes." (Title 28, Sec. 16). The Judges of the Municipal Court and the United States Commissioner who serve
as committing magistrates in the District of Columbia usually are not in their offices on afternoon Saturday holidays.
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In my judgment therefore, the police had the right to assume that no committing magistrate would be available after
their investigation of the defendant's case had been completed.'
"The court held that defendant's admissions were properly received in evidence because it was undisputed that he was not subjected to any coercion prior to the time when the last admission
was made at one o'clock Sunday afternoon. There was unreasonable delay, according to the court, in taking him before the committing magistrate; that should have been done on Monday instead
of Tuesday. But this did not alter the fact that at the time the
admissions were made defendant's detention was legal; hence they
were properly submitted to the jury. The motion for a new trial
was accordingly overruled."
In Wheeler v. United States,29 decided by the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, in which the appellant and one Patton were convicted
of murder, the court held: 3 0
"It is true that in holding Patton from 3:00 o'clock Sunday
morning until Tuesday without taking him to the nearest available
commissioner, the officers violated Federal Criminal Rule 5(a), 18
USCA following Section 687. Patton relies upon the following cases
as showing that, on that account, he is entitled to a reversal ...
[The McNabb case was included in those cited]. Those authorities do not help him, as the facts of this case render them inapplicable. While the officers acted wrongfully in failing to present Patton to a commissioner more quickly than they did, it does not appear that the delay induced the confession which he made Monday
night." [Patton had been arrested on a Sunday and was first questioned at 7:00 P. M. on the day following, when he confessed the
crime].
Further, in Alderman v. United States,3 1 decided by the same appellate court, a case in which appellant was convicted of housebreaking and
32
grand larceny, the court held:
29165 F.2d 225

(C. C. A. D. C. 1947).

"I1d. at 230.
3'16 F.2d 622 (C. C. A. D. C. 1947).
"Id. at 623 (Italics supplied).
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"Alderman insists, however, that to detain him from the time
of his arrest at about 1:00 A. M. on November 19th until November 21st without taking him before a magistrate was a violation of
Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U. S. C.
A. following Section 687, and rendered his confession inadmissible.
It will be noted that Alderman confessed the first time between
11:00 o'clock and noon on November 19th, after a brief interrogation. As he had been arrested shortly after 1:00 o'clock A. M.,
and had been accused of housebreaking by Scott during the interview which began at 9:15 that morning, it cannot be said that his
detention until 11:00 A. M. was unreasonable. The subsequent
delay of two days before carrying him before a magistrate, even if
it were in violation of Rule 5 (a), which we do not decide, did not
retroactively invalidate the confession made before noon on the
19th ....[citing cases]. It should not be necessary to repeat what
is so clearly pointed out in the Mitchell and Boone cases, that unreasonabledelay, without accompanying aggravatingcircumstances,
in presenting a prisonerto a magistrate,though itself unlawful and
inexcusable, does not render inadmissible the prisoner's confession,
unless it be found that the disclosure was induced by the detention.
It is not here claimed that Alderman's statements were the fruit of
detention alone; and his contention that it was aggravated by police
brutality which extorted his admissions was submitted to, and rejected by the jury. He was entitled to no more than to have the jury
pass on the conflicting evidence concerning his alleged ill-treatment."
The foregoing cases announce the rule, in substance, to be that, in order for unlawful detention, or unnecessary delay to invalidate an otherwise voluntary confession, such disclosure must have been induced by the
wrongful detention, and that what is meant by "unnecessary delay" must
depend upon the facts of each case; yet such cases all ante-date the
Upshaw decision of the Supreme Court in December, 1948, which neither
defines "unnecessary delay" nor qualifies the rule announced in the McNabb decision. Although such cases are most logical and persuasive,
until the Supreme Court defines "unnecessary delay" doubt must continue
to exist as to the admissibility of an otherwise voluntary confession in any
case in which the arrested person is not presented to the committing magistrate with the greatest of promptness and expedition.
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